The idea to take a closer look at this famous game and at this famous endgame goes back to Alex Fishbein. Since the Fischer – Spassky match in Reykjavik 1972 this game has been analysed extensively and by a variety of commentators, of which Garry Kasparov in "My Great Predecessors IV: Fischer" (2004) and Jan Timman in "The art of Chess Analysis" (1997) might be the most prominent. However, modern engines throw a different light on the game.
One finding is that Fischer missed the best moves on move 39 and 40, just before the time-control at move 40. He should have played 39.g4!+- and 40.g4!+- to start immediate play on the kingside.
Wolfram Schoen sums up the conclusions of the analyses:
Previous analyses of this game are not always correct. In fact, until move 38 Spassky had a viable position. However, after a series of five consecutive errors (two by Fischer, three by Spassky), which were pointed out by Charles Sullivan in 2018, Black’s position was lost.
- 38...h5? (38...Be5 = or 38...Ra6 =)
- 39.Rb6? (39.g4! +-)
- 39...Rd1? (39...Kf5! =)
- 40.Kf3? (40.g4! +-)
- 40...Kf7? (40...Rd3+! =)
Earlier in the game both players made several inaccuracies in the complicated middlegame, and for half a century Spassky has erroneously been accused of bad play.
- 26.Bb3?! (Objectively harmless. 26.b6 and 26.bxa6! are more dangerous.)
- 29...Re7 (Not the big/decisive mistake. At least as good as 29...Rad8, if not a bit better.)
- 32...Bxe4 (Ok, but not forced and the start of Black's practical problems. 32...c4 holds, but 32...b4!, which almost equalises, is even better.)
- 35...Ra1+ (Ok, but the second reason for Black's trouble. 35...Bd6! holds more comfortably. However, Larsen's 35...b4?, which was considered an improvement/last saving chance, seems to lead to a lost position.)
Helmut Kahovec used his usual block analysis method with Stockfish 14 to analyse the endgame:
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